While collaborations can easily become complex,
multi-faceted associations between several organizations, in its simplest form,
a collaboration begins as dyadic relationship between a non-profit organization
and another non-profit organization, a for-profit company, or a government
agency. Typically, this dyad includes two individuals representing their
organization.
Much like A Streetcar Named Desire, the role each
party plays in collaboration depends on their goals and perspectives. Blanche
Dubois is ruled by her philosophy and often adjusts for harsh realities by
misrepresenting them or ignoring them. Non-profit organizations often fail to
marriage their philosophical goals with their collaboration goals and, in
failing to frame their vision for the collaboration (UnitedWay Worldwide, 2008)
with fundamental process factors of success (Sharma and Missey, 1998),
non-profit organizations fail to sustain collaborations. Stanley Kowalski, on
the other hand, is rooted in dichotomous truths and instinct. Government
agencies and for-profit companies, particularly the latter, have dichotomous
'bottom lines' that not only measure their success, but are unflinchingly rigid
and often dominate the collaboration.
Here, I examine
one non-profit collaboration specifically, identify the role played (Blanche
vs. Stanley), and examine the success of the collaboration.
La Alianza
Hispana and the Boston Dept. of Social Services (Non-Profit and Gov't Agency)
After years
of criticism for lacking cultural competency and an increasing caseload, the
Boston Department of Social Services (DSS) approached La Alianza Hispanaa (La
Alianza, for short) with a harsh proposal: Either lose all DSS funding (which
constituted a significant percentage of La Alianza's income) or accept a
substantial increase in funding to provide all child protection and case
management services to Latino children in Boston (a service that La Alianza had
never provided before) (Varley, 1996).
Here, DSS is
clearly Stanley because their goal was measurably dichotomous and their
approach was rigid. For DSS, success was getting La Alianza to accept the
contract (dichotomous) and their approach disallowed collaboration and often
shuttered communication (rigid).
La Alianza
played Blanche because while they stuck to their overall philosophy of
bettering life for the Latino community in Boston, they ignored the major fault
with the collaboration, which was a lack of communication and a lack of
negotiation. Some of their board members verbalized their concerns that the per
case funding was insufficient to cover overhead and the role they played in the
Latino community would be severely compromised, but they did very little to
address the stark imbalance in power dynamics. Further, La Alizanza would have
been agreeing to provide a service that they had no experience in providing.
While some training would have been provided by DSS, La Alianza would ultimately
be shifting toward mission creep in fear of losing their funding.
This
collaboration was unsuccessful for several reasons. According to Mattesich and
Monsey’s Collaboration: What Makes It
Work, as cited by Sharma and Missey (1998), there are nineteen factors for
successful collaborations spanning six categories. Of them, sixteen went
unfulfilled. Yes, the sociopolitical environment corroborated the collaboration
and was an opportunity for success. The Latino community in Boston was expanding
and suffering due to the crack-cocaine epidemic, which both DSS and La Alianza
recognized as a moment of intervention. However, the history between DSS and
the La Alianza (and the Latino community at large) was strained with no sign of
reversal, flexibility and adaptability were ostensibly disallowed, resources
were insufficient, and communication was poor. Further, a namely due to the
lack of communication and lack or flexibility, shared-decision making was absent
and the vision for the collaboration was not shared between both parties, two
keys of a successful collaboration identified by the National Civic League
(UnitedWay Worldwide, 2008).
Other
Types of Non-Profit Collaborations
As mentioned earlier, non-profit organizations
also collaborate with for-profit companies and other non-profits, but the
barriers to success are no different. When City Year partnered with Tiberland
to provide apparel, both parties were somewhere between Blanche and Stanley.
However, when Timberland’s bottom-line was at-risk (they saw slowed growth and
declining profits), they abandoned the project because their measure of success
did not include/measure value from the branding association – it only included
profit. This collaboration would have been more successful if Timberland had
expanded their measures of success to include multiple aspects along the value
creation spectrum because the associational value was complementary for both
parties, especially Timberland (Austin and Seitanidi as cited by Renz, 2016).
A non-profit collaboration with another non-profit
faces the same challenges, particularly when vision and philosophy aren’t
shared as those flexible definitions fuel non-profit work. In the collaboration
between the Seattle Art Museum (SAM) and Low-Income Housing, the vision for
funding allocation, political capital, and implementation was not shared
between each party and the underlying philosophies clashed, resulting in an
inability to communicate to the public the value added through the collaboration.
Conclusion
Overall, collaborations are neither sustainable nor successful when either party takes on an extreme role like Blanche or Stanley. So, avoid the dramatics, communicate, and collaborate in the decision-making. And make a checklist!
