Collaborations: Why They Fail
There
are many reasons why organizations decide to collaborate: financial stability,
services diversification and expansion, to avoid extinction and to share revenue
and funding sources,[1] to
name a few. Collaborations can be short term or permanent,
depending on the common objective that cannot be achieved by either party independently. They can be inter-sectional: a nonprofit organization
and a government agency, a government agency and a for profit, and a nonprofit
and a for profit. Inter-sectional
collaborations are complex because of the unique constituencies they serve,
their distinct stakeholders, and the funders to whom they are accountable. For profits such as Timberland[2]
answer to their shareholders, not their employees; profit is the driver of decisions. Service-oriented government agencies such as
the Massachusetts Department of Social Services[3]
(MDSS) are accountable to legislative bodies and are funded by appropriations
bills. Nonprofits like La Alianza
Hispana (LAH) are accountable to their distinct cultural community, the clients
that are served, and their donors.
The
characteristics of successful collaborations among organizations vary according
to their purpose. Some key components to
consider are: 1) a shared purpose or vision, 2) a similar client-stakeholder
base, 3) sufficient trust, 4) a strategic plan, and 5) inclusive communication,
not just among top officers and management but employees, volunteers and
stakeholders as well.[4] Three case studies, the Seattle Art Museum,[5] Timberland,
and the Massachusetts Department of Social Services exemplify common challenges
and why collaborations can weaken, fail or never move forward.
Two nonprofits, the
Seattle Art Museum (SAM) and the First Things First (FTF) Coalition united to
avoid losing an election that would fund either the Seattle Art Museum Project or the First Things First
low-income housing initiative. Theirs
was a defensive collaboration, with a short-term, narrow shared vision to bring
about a win-win outcome resulting in funding for both organizations. Their constituencies and missions were
dissimilar, trust was tenuous and strategic campaign planning one-sided. Neither organization engaged with opposite
party stakeholders. Communication by SAM
did not flow outward to FTF’s extensive coalition or downward to its army of
volunteers, and thereby justified their mistrust of SAM's motives. Nearing the election, SAM found that FTF had stronger public
support.
Collaboration
attempts between the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (MDSS) and the
nonprofit La Alianza Hispana (LAH) didn’t work because of their opposing visions of child protection and what that meant. The constituencies
that both organizations served were similar; however, LAH believed that the
methods used by MDSS, removing children from their families, were culturally
inappropriate and counterproductive to their mission of keeping families
together. Also, subsumed by the bureaucratic structure
of MDSS, LAH knew that it would not be treated as an equal, that it would lose
its autonomy, identity and standing in the Hispanic community. According to LAH’s board chairman, there was
no basis for trust; he threatened to resign if the board agreed to move forward.
In
contrast, the partnership between the for profit Timberland Company and the nonprofit City
Year was symbiotic, fueled by a similar passion for social justice remediated through
volunteerism by City Year’s corps of volunteers, in which Timberland largely
invested. For several years, the partnership
enjoyed national attention, prestige and enormous profits for Timberland. Then the government withdrew its support for
City Year’s national AmeriCore volunteer program, cutting one half of the
nonprofit’s $14 million annual budget. Concurrently, the economy declined and
Timberland’s profit margin collapsed, to the extent that many employees were
laid off. The employees were resentful
of City Year, who they felt had caused the layoffs.
The
collaboration ultimately failed. It
wanted for a strategic plan for financial sustainability to offset a
disproportionate reliance on Timberland for funding. There was no long-term vision of the
partnership; employees and stakeholders had no understanding of what the
partnership entailed. Communication
between the organizations was at the management level, with no widespread
communication of a vision at all levels.
Employees were involved only at the volunteer level. It is no wonder they were resentful.
Examples such as these can be used in positive ways to forewarn against failure.
[1] Yankey,
J.A., Jacobus, B.W. and Koney, K. M., Merging Nonprofit Organizations: The Art
and Science of the Deal, Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Cleveland,
Ohio, 2001.
[2] Timberland
and Community Involvement, Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA,
August 1996.
[3]
Partners in Child Protection Services: The Department of Social Services and La
Alianza Hispana, the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University,
1996.
[4] “Best
Practices Summary: Collaboration, Coalition-Building and Merger,” United Way
Worldwide, 2008.
[5]
Funding Seattle’s Art Museum and Low-Income Housing: The Politics of Interest
Groups and Tax Levies, Cascade Center for Public Service, Curriculum Exchange,
1996.
