Showing posts with label Selene McHugh. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Selene McHugh. Show all posts

Thursday, April 30, 2015

Diversity: Its Benefits and Challenges




I am writing this blog several days after the death of Freddie Gray, a black male of 24, who was confronted by policemen in Baltimore, Maryland, while riding a bicycle.  During the arrest, his neck was broken, and he died several days later.   Riots in Maryland’s black communities followed, policemen were injured, cars and buildings were set afire and the National Guard was called in.  Now, civic leaders, the media and political analysts are offering their perspectives on what went wrong.  Unabated joblessness, racial bias and police brutality are common themes, but I haven’t heard much about cultural differences, including police culture, or communication.
One might ask, if police forces are and have diversified in terms of gender and race integration since the last quarter of the 20th Century, why are there still problems?  One answer is that contemporary constructs of diversity and integration are understood superficially.  For example, segregated racial and ethnic enclaves can mix with a dominant culture’s civic and work environments, but they may not interpret, perceive or respond to things differently than the prevailing culture’s norms and mores.[1]  

American police agencies exemplify what Thomas and Ely describe as discrimination-fairness and access-legitimacy paradigms, based on gender and racial assimilation to achieve a demographically representative workforce.[2]    The problem with these integration models is that the skills, beliefs and values of different cultures are not legitimated, absorbed or translated into the real work that is done on the front lines.  In other words, there is a learning deficit on the part of the dominant culture.
The consequences of this are well documented in the literature of airplane crashes, which claim that their main causes are errors in teamwork and communication predicated on cultural legacy, i.e., the assumptions and perceptions handed down by the history of the communities people come from.” [3]  Researchers found that in a cockpit, cultural deference norms dominated.  Even when subordinates preemptively identified errors, they remained non-assertive towards those perceived as “in charge.”[4]
The disproportionate killing of black males by policemen attest that learning from those of different racial and ethnic backgrounds is missing from police cultures in cities across America.  Even if law enforcement workplaces are representatively diversified, those of different racial backgrounds may feel pressure to fit into the dominant culture, to the extent that they defer to those in higher ranks or to teammates rather than speak out against excessive force used on racially different suspects.
The glaring problem is that of communication awareness within context of cultural differences.  If learning about cultural communication differences occurred in police training curriculums, perhaps Eric Garner would be alive today.  In July 2014, Eric Garner died after an NYPD officer put him in a chokehold.  An irritated Mr. Garner told the police who accosted him on suspicion of selling untaxed cigarettes individually to passersby that he was “tired of being harassed”.  A group of officers moved in to arrest him, one of whom took Garner’s wrist behind his back, to which he backed up and swatted the officer’s arms away.  In response, the officer put his arm around Garner's neck and pulled him backwards and down onto the ground. After the officer removed his arm from Garner's neck, he pushed Garner's face into the ground while four more officers moved to restrain Garner, who repeated "I can't breathe" eleven times while lying face down on the sidewalk.  After Garner lost consciousness, officers finally turned him onto his side to ease his breathing, but it was too late.
Noticeably absent from this scene were black officers, who might have used their cultural perspectives and communication skills to diffuse Mr. Garner’s defensive animosity.  Perhaps they would have interpreted in a nonthreatening way his angry frustration of being “harassed.”  Perhaps, instead, they would have issued Mr. Garner a warning about NYC sales tax compliance, giving him time to think objectively, without demeaning and further antagonizing him.   
Perhaps, too, the death of Freddie Gray could have been averted if policemen worked in racially-integrated teams, each demonstrating their cultural skills to the other, learning what it means to serve their communities authentically, by reflecting the reality of people’s lives in their reactions and decisions.  In this way they would earn genuine authority. (Wood, M. & Harwood, R., 2005)[5]


[1] Sowell, Thomas. "A world view of cultural diversity." Society 29.1 (1991): 37-44. 
[2] Thomas, David A., and Robin J. Ely. "Making differences matter: A new paradigm for managing diversity." Harvard business review 74.5 (1996): 79.
[3] Gladwell, Malcolm.  Outliers: The Story of Success, Ch. 7, “The Ethnic Theory of Plane Crashes,”2008. New York: Little, Brown and Company.
[4] Ibid.
[5] Wood, M. R. "Standards of Excellence in Civic Engagement: How Public Agencies Can Learn from the Community, Use What They Learn, and Demonstrate that Public Knowledge Matters." The Harwood Institute (2005).

Thursday, April 9, 2015

Strategic Planning: A Process for Success



Strategic Planning: A Process for Success
The benefits of strategic planning for a non-profit organization are manifold.  A strategic plan is paramount if an organization wants to avoid failure, stanch financial loss and retain its stakeholders.  A plan is strategic when organizational decision making is aligned with the realities of its external and internal environments.  It comprises six elements: a vision evaluation, a SWOT analysis, a current and future issues breakdown, plan development, plan implementation, and last an evaluation design.
            First, a vision should encompass what success will look like for an organization.  From it flows a mission that states what an organization is committed to in order to achieve its vision.  A mission statement should clarify its public value and serve as a framework for its distinct identity and unique purpose.  It requires consensus not only within the organization but by stakeholders who critically influence its sustainability.   Without organizational loyalty to its tenets, missions are subject to competing objectives externally and to disagreement on direction and emphasis internally.  If mission revision is necessary, organizational restructuring that adheres to the mission is the first strategic step.
            Second, a SWOT analysis of an organization’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats examines the external and internal environmental trends that impact its relevance and continuity.  External trends involve the networks, relationships and political surroundings that define an organization’s context.  An organization must identify and respond to external threats such as competition, as well as detect and take advantage of opportunities such as considering partnerships.
            Third, a statement of strategic issues should include a succinct description of each issue and a list of factors that explain why each is consequential.  A statement should follow that outlines the gravity of underestimating untoward future developments.   Two group participation methods can be used to galvanize organizational issues examination: the Implication Wheel and the Nominal Group Technique.  Both methods start with a center; one on the implications of not planning, the other on the benefits of planning.  Both techniques are used to engage and encourage staff and management to articulate problems that stem outward from the center.  
            Fourth and fifth, after recognizing stakeholder expectations and external market opportunities and challenges, the process of strategy formation and implementation follow. In the planning stages, interviews, focus groups and conversations about purpose guide the creation of goals to move an organization forward.  In his essay on the challenges of strategic management, Tregoe tells us that having a strategy is not enough, that separation between the role of planning to set strategy and the role of management to implement strategy must be understood.[1]  That is, strategic planning analyzes environmental conditions and develops goals accordingly.  Conversely, strategic management ensures cohesiveness by aligning inputs (resources), processes (present strategy) and outputs (performance) with internal and external environments.[2]   Kaplan and Norton caution about awareness of moving targets for gauging progress, because external conditions and targets for success keep changing. [3]  Planning and implementation, therefore, call for preparation for continual improvements in operating efficiencies to produce desired outcomes.  For example, strategy formation and implementation should include fail safe communication channels that cycle throughout an organization enabling timely responsiveness between staff, field offices/field workers and clients, staff to management, management to stakeholders, and management to board members. 
Sixth is evaluation, the desired outcomes and how to measure them.  In developing performance measures and timelines, room should be left for innovation in order to adapt, if necessary, to changing environments.  In their discussion of the balanced scorecard, Kaplan and Norton advise that organizations “articulate goals for time, quality, performance and service and then translate these goals into specific measures.”[4]  Articulate is the operative word here.  What is it that we are measuring?  Will these measures be valid representations of goal attainment?  They stress the importance of gauging accomplishment through the eyes of the customer/client.  I would add stakeholders as well.
In tracking progress, it is crucial to distinguish between process objectives, i.e., inputs, outcome objectives, and the measurable differences before and after an intervention or service provision.  Therefore, strategy should include midcourse evaluations and corrective procedures to allow necessary adjustments.  In this way, organizational learning is enhanced and strengthened.


[1] Tregoe, B., “The Challenges of Strategic Management,” Ch. 6, p. 106.
[2] Bryson, J.M., “Strategic Planning and the Strategy Change Cycle,” The Jossey-Bass Handbook of Nonprofit Leadership and Management, Third Edition, p. 240.
[3] Kaplan, R. S., and Norton, D. P., “The Balanced Scorecard - Measures that Drive Performance,” The Harvard Business Review, January-February 1992, p. 75.
[4] Ibid.

Collaborations: Why They Fail



Collaborations:  Why They Fail
There are many reasons why organizations decide to collaborate: financial stability, services diversification and expansion, to avoid extinction and to share revenue and funding sources,[1] to name a few.   Collaborations can be short term or permanent, depending on the common objective that cannot be achieved by either party independently.    They can be inter-sectional: a nonprofit organization and a government agency, a government agency and a for profit, and a nonprofit and a for profit.  Inter-sectional collaborations are complex because of the unique constituencies they serve, their distinct stakeholders, and the funders to whom they are accountable.  For profits such as Timberland[2] answer to their shareholders, not their employees; profit is the driver of decisions.  Service-oriented government agencies such as the Massachusetts Department of Social Services[3] (MDSS) are accountable to legislative bodies and are funded by appropriations bills.  Nonprofits like La Alianza Hispana (LAH) are accountable to their distinct cultural community, the clients that are served, and their donors.
The characteristics of successful collaborations among organizations vary according to their purpose.  Some key components to consider are: 1) a shared purpose or vision, 2) a similar client-stakeholder base, 3) sufficient trust, 4) a strategic plan, and 5) inclusive communication, not just among top officers and management but employees, volunteers and stakeholders as well.[4]  Three case studies, the Seattle Art Museum,[5] Timberland, and the Massachusetts Department of Social Services exemplify common challenges and why collaborations can weaken, fail or never move forward.
Two nonprofits, the Seattle Art Museum (SAM) and the First Things First (FTF) Coalition united to avoid losing an election that would fund either the Seattle Art Museum Project or the First Things First low-income housing initiative.  Theirs was a defensive collaboration, with a short-term, narrow shared vision to bring about a win-win outcome resulting in funding for both organizations.  Their constituencies and missions were dissimilar, trust was tenuous and strategic campaign planning one-sided.  Neither organization engaged with opposite party stakeholders.  Communication by SAM did not flow outward to FTF’s extensive coalition or downward to its army of volunteers, and thereby justified their mistrust of SAM's motives.  Nearing the election, SAM found that FTF had stronger public support.                    
Collaboration attempts between the Massachusetts Department of Social Services (MDSS) and the nonprofit La Alianza Hispana (LAH) didn’t work because of their opposing visions of child protection and what that meant.  The constituencies that both organizations served were similar; however, LAH believed that the methods used by MDSS, removing children from their families, were culturally inappropriate and counterproductive to their mission of keeping families together.   Also, subsumed by the bureaucratic structure of MDSS, LAH knew that it would not be treated as an equal, that it would lose its autonomy, identity and standing in the Hispanic community.  According to LAH’s board chairman, there was no basis for trust; he threatened to resign if the board agreed to move forward.
In contrast, the partnership between the for profit Timberland Company and the nonprofit City Year was symbiotic, fueled by a similar passion for social justice remediated through volunteerism by City Year’s corps of volunteers, in which Timberland largely invested.  For several years, the partnership enjoyed national attention, prestige and enormous profits for Timberland.   Then the government withdrew its support for City Year’s national AmeriCore volunteer program, cutting one half of the nonprofit’s $14 million annual budget. Concurrently, the economy declined and Timberland’s profit margin collapsed, to the extent that many employees were laid off.  The employees were resentful of City Year, who they felt had caused the layoffs.
The collaboration ultimately failed.  It wanted for a strategic plan for financial sustainability to offset a disproportionate reliance on Timberland for funding.  There was no long-term vision of the partnership; employees and stakeholders had no understanding of what the partnership entailed.  Communication between the organizations was at the management level, with no widespread communication of a vision at all levels.  Employees were involved only at the volunteer level.  It is no wonder they were resentful.
Examples such as these can be used in positive ways to forewarn against failure.


[1] Yankey, J.A., Jacobus, B.W. and Koney, K. M., Merging Nonprofit Organizations: The Art and Science of the Deal, Mandel Center for Nonprofit Organizations, Cleveland, Ohio, 2001.
[2] Timberland and Community Involvement, Harvard Business School Publishing, Boston, MA, August 1996.
[3] Partners in Child Protection Services: The Department of Social Services and La Alianza Hispana, the John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 1996.
[4] “Best Practices Summary: Collaboration, Coalition-Building and Merger,” United Way Worldwide, 2008.
[5] Funding Seattle’s Art Museum and Low-Income Housing: The Politics of Interest Groups and Tax Levies, Cascade Center for Public Service, Curriculum Exchange, 1996.

Thursday, March 5, 2015

Change: From Resistance to Transformation



The predicate of transformation is a mind-set change.  (Cameron[1]; Tichy & Charan[2])  This is not easy.  Psychological impediments to change are powerful.  They’re embedded in cultural norms, belief systems, presuppositions and, at times, leadership hubris.  Cultural norms and belief systems are established ways of framing one’s environment.  Presuppositions hold that certain phenomena are true without any proof, and leadership hubris means that if it worked before it’ll work again.   These “sacred cows” within organizations are the “implicitly held beliefs, unarticulated values and tacit understandings of the way things should be done.”[3]  There are exogenous hindrances as well, but my focus will be on relationships, for that is where change is formative. 

Cameron informs us that change is difficult within organizations because it is usually disruptive to social relationships and threatens power and status structures.[4]  Mindsets influence relationships, such as between executive management and the board of directors.  In the Habitat for Humanity case study Jeff Snider, the executive VP, and Millard Fuller, Habitat’s founder and board president, held different views on what success should look like.  Fuller, the spiritual leader and visionary, was impervious to the day-to-day operational imperatives that went unmet and staggered under the weight of Habitat’s expansion. [5]  

Leadership hubris and hard-and-fast belief systems adversely affected the relationship between Habitat’s mission and its programmatic capacity.   The board disagreed with Snider’s requests to invest in professional human resource development because volunteerism was the core of Habitat’s culture and spiritual mission.  To change its dependency on grass roots volunteer labor and generally inexperienced administrative staff instilled fear in the board of “losing our soul and becoming an institution.“[6]  Guided by hubris, Fuller insisted on building more homes and enlarging Habitat’s presence in more developing countries without deliberating or exploring how the organization would do so. “We’re just going to,” he said.[7]

As Habitat grew in scale and scope, relationships between headquarters and its affiliates were adversely affected.  Fuller and his board presupposed that, in the absence of adequate organizational support, affiliates could depend on cultural and spiritual values to operationalize their missions.  This was not accurate.  Increasingly, Habitat affiliates perceived headquarters as irrelevant for their needs and they distanced themselves.

My point is that relationships are central to change and they are influenced by cultural norms, belief systems, presupposition and varying degrees of hubris.  It is from this nexus that transformation must emerge.   Following are suggestions on how to make this happen.
  1.  Be prepared to answer the question, “Why should we change?”  Be impeccably clear about the organization’s mission, e.g., “What is our mission and how do we know that we are being loyal to it?”  Identify discrepancies between organizational activities and the core mission.  Ask, “Are we really meeting the needs of our stakeholders, affiliates and their beneficiaries?”    A mission statement may need reworking to accommodate the imperatives of program growth, environmental fluctuation and new agreed-upon direction.  The question then becomes, “What should we do to do it better?”
2.       Create a clear picture of an optimally functioning headquarters.  Ask, “What do we want our future to look like?”  Come to terms with limitations by asking, “Are we balancing organizational expansion with organizational capacity?  Ask, “What do we need to do to avoid the quagmires we’ve experienced in the past?  Investment in human resources is key. (Cameron, 1991; Tichy and Charan, 1989).  “How do we become relevant to affiliates?”  Replace affiliate marginalization with affiliate involvement.  This can be done through regional focus groups to take advantage of the inventive capacity of individuals and small groups.  

3.       Identify environmental factors that impact the organization by asking, “Are we as an organization conscious of exogenous threats like competition, program duplication, economic fluctuation, donor base contraction, willy-nilly expansion and affiliate distancing?   If the answer is yes, then planning in order to survive/circumvent such events is paramount.  Hamel and Prahalad talk about the difference between “strategic intent” and strategic planning.  A traditional strategic plan concentrates on what is feasible, while strategic intent is an “obsession with possibility” that focuses on opportunity. [8]  One could ask, “Is it possible to draw from both kinds of strategy?

4.       Promote communication and transparency from highest to lowest levels throughout the organization.   Jack Welch, CEO of GE, believed that “people are the engine” and that open communication should permeate a culture. (Tichy and Charan, 1989).  Make transparency a priority not only for the IRS, but for affiliates.  Disseminate information about headquarter business, affiliate progress, success stories, innovation, etc. to strengthen national and international ties.

5.       Consider the question, “How will we know that we’re successful?”   It’s essential to concretely define desired outcomes when formulating performance indicators.   Tregoe talks about developing strategic performance standards that can be used in succession planning to accommodate change over time, which may entail new standards. [9]  The point to make here is that success is a moving target and that current achievements should anticipate supporting future achievements.  He advises thinking about “strategy beyond existing strategy.” (Tregoe, p. 113)



[1] Cameron, K., Transformational Leadership, Ch.10 in Developing Management Skills, New York: Harper-Collins, 1991.
[2] Tichy, N. and Charan, R., “Speed, Simplicity, Self-Confidence: An Interview with Jack Welch, Harvard Business Review, September-October 1989.
[3] Tregoe, B., “The Challenges of Strategic Management,” Ch. 6, page 111.
[4] Cameron, K., page 8.
[5] Slavitt, A. and Loveman, G., Habitat for Humanity International, Harvard Business School Publishing Division, Boston, MA, 1993, page 8.
[6] Ibid., page 8.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Hamel, G. and Prahalad, C.K., “Strategic Intent,” Harvard Business Review, May-June 1989, page 66.
[9] Tregoe, B., Ch. 6, pages 102 and 105.